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RIGHT OF SURETY TO SUBROGATION AGAINST
THIRD PARTY
Subrogation is the right of a surety to be substituted to the position
of the creditor whom he pays.' In the typical subrogation situation
a suit is brought by the surety against the principal debtor. A difficult
problem arises when the person against whom the surety seeks sub-
rogation is not the principal debtor of the suretyship contract, but
rather is a third person not a party to the contract.
This situation is considered in Bank of Fort Mill v. Lawyers Title
Ins. Corp.2 One Sims applied to Perpetual Building and Loan Asso-
ciation for a mortgage loan. Before making the loan, Perpetual pro-
cured Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation as surety to guarantee
the title. An attorney approved by the surety procured the policy
of title insurance for Perpetual and closed the transaction. Without
authority, the attorney signed Sims' name to the mortgage and notes
and falsely certified that the title was in Sims. Perpetual made the
loan by drawing a check on defendant bank payable jointly to
Sims and the attorney. The attorney forged Sims' endorsement and
deposited the proceeds in his own account in the First National Bank
of South Carolina. When the title defect-became known, the surety
paid Perpetual and took an assignment of all claims and causes of
action that Perpetual might have had arising out of this transaction.
The surety then proceeded against the Bank of Fort Mill under
the theory of subrogation.
The United States District Court of the Western District of South
Carolina rendered judgment for the plaintiff surety3 reasoning that
there would have been no loss if the defendant bank had not accepted
the forged check, even though the title were defective.4 Since the
liability of defendant bank to Perpetual and the liability of the
surety to Perpetual arose under different circumstances, the court con-
cluded that there was "no reason for balancing equities"5 and that,
therefore, the bank was liable to the surety.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and re-
manded the decision on the grounds that subrogation, as an eqitable
right, demands a balancing of the equities and that the compensated
"Simpson, Suretyship 205 (1950); see e.g., Restatement, Security § 141 (1941).
2268 F.2d 83 (4th Cir. 1959).




surety had no right of subrogation as against the innocent drawee
bank.6 In addition, the court refused to recognize any new rights
arising in favor of the surety because of the assignment.1
As a general rule, subrogation is allowed the surety when its equi-
ties are superior to those of the third party;s but subrogation is denied
when the equities of the third party are equal or superior to those of
the surety.9 The court in the principal case found the equities of the
"innocent bank" superior to those of the surety because "the surety
company is paid to assume the specific risk." 10 In view of the fact
that in modern business transactions most sureties are professional,
compensated surety companies, the question arises as to when, if ever,
the equities of the surety will be superior to those of a third party.
Thus the basic problem confronting the courts is that of determining
the relative equities of the surety and the third party.
In the absence of other factors affecting the relative equities, some
courts base the result upon the fact that the surety was compensated.1 1
However, recovery has been allowed the compensated surety against
the third party based upon the following factors: (i) negligence on
the part of the third party;' 2 (2) intentionally tortious conduct by the
third party;13 (3) knowledge by the third party of fraud on the part
of the principal debtor; 14 (4) contractual obligation of the third party,
GBank of Fort Mill v. Lawyers Title Ins. Co., 268 F.2d 313, 317 (4 th Cir. 1959).
7Id. at 316.
'Annot., 137 A.L.R. 700 (1942); Simpson, Suretyship 220 (195o).
'Security Fence Co. v. Manchester Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 136 A.2d 910, 912
(1957); Annot., 137 A.L.R. 697 (1942); Simpson, Suretyship 220 (1950); Sterns, Surety-
ship 447 (5th ed. 1951). Cf. Northern Trust Co. v. Consolidated Elevator Co., 142
Minn. 152, 171 N.W. 265, 268 ('919) wherein it was said, "It [subrogation] will
never be enforced when the equitiees are equal or the rights not clear."
1268 F.2d at 315.
1Id.; United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 172 F.2d 258, 263 (sth
Cir. 1949); Louisville Trust Co. v. Royal Indem. Co., 23o Ky. 482, 2o SAV.2d 71
(1929); American Bonding Co. v. State Say. Bank, 47 Mont. 332, 133 Pac. 367, 368
(1913). Cf. Baker v. American Sur. Co., 181 Iowa 634, 159 N.W. 1o44 (1916). Contra,
Bench Canal Drainage Dist. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 278 Fed. 67 (8th Cir. 1921); Simp-
son, Suretyship 221 (1950).
"Rivers v. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 135 S.C. 107, 133 S.E. 210 (1926). Accord, Fidelity
& Deposit Co. v. Oklahoma State Bank, 77 F.2d 734 (1oth Cir. 1935); Martin v. Fed-
eral Sur. Co., 58 F.2d 79 (8th Cir. 1932); cf. Richfield Nat'l Bank v. American Sur.
Co., 39 F.2d 387 (8th Cir. 1930).
"Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v. Foil, 189 S.C. 91, 200 S.E. 97 (1938) (conversion).
It seems that the rule should also apply to fraud.
-Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Bank of Smithfield, ii F. Supp. 9o4n (E.D. Va. 1932);
American Nat'l Bank v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 129 Ga. 126, 58 S.E. 867 (1907); Ran-
dell v. Fellers, 218 Iowa 1005, 252 N.W. 787 (1934); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Queens
County Trust Co., 226 N.Y. 225, 123 N.E. 370 (1919); United States Fid. & Guar. Co.
v. United Nat'l Bank, 8o Ore. 361, 157 Pac. 155 (1916).
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such as by endorsement; 15 (5) participation by the third party in the
act which caused the liability; 16 (6) assignment to the surety of claims
and causes of action against the third party; 17 and (7) the distinct
and unrelated nature of the liabilities between the surety and the
principal debtor and those between the third party and the principal
debtor.' 8
It appears that the last three of these factors might have been
grounds for a decision in favor of the surety in the Fort Mill case.
By honoring the forged check, the Bank of Fort Mill participated in
the act which caused the liability. As suggested by the District Court:
"If the check of Perpetual had not been honored, Perpetual ... would
have suffered no loss. Perpetual would still have had its funds and no
matter how invalid the title might have been without loss there could
have been no claim against plaintiff."' 9
When the principal debtor has given the surety an assignment of
claims and causes of action against the third party, as in the principal
case, some courts have recognized a new legal interest as having re-
placed the old equitable one and have allowed subrogation on the
theory that the assignment and its resultant legal interest are superior
to the equities of the third party.2 ° The weight of authority, however,
has rejected this on the ground that the rights of the surety cannot
be improved by the assignment.
21
When the liabilities between the surety and the principal debtor
and those between the third party and the principal debtor arise
from distinct and unrelated transactions, such as in the Fort Mill
case, the equities of the third party have been held not to be superior
to those of the surety. In Kansas City Title & Trust Co. v. Fourth
Nat'l Bank,2 2 wherein the defendant bank had paid a large sum of
2Standard Acc. Ins. Go. v. Pellecchia, 15 N.J. 162, 104 A.2d 288 (1954).
"American Bonding Co. v. National Mechanics Bank, 97 Md. 598, 55 Ati. 395
(19o3) (knowledge equals participation).
TNational Sur. Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 210 Iowa 323, 228 N.W. 635 (1930);
National Sur. Co. v. National City Bank, 184 App. Div. 771, 172 N.Y. Supp. 413 (Sup.
Ct. 1918); Grubnau v. Continental Nat'l Bank, 279 Pa. 5oi, 124 At. 142 (1924); cf.
First Nat'l Bank v. American Sur. CO., 71 Ga. App. 112, 30 S.E.2d 402 (1944) (Re-
covery allowed at Law). Contra, American Sur. Co. v. Bank of Calif., 133 F.2d i6o,
164 (9 th Cir. 1943); Simpson, Suretyship 221 (1956). Cf. Sloat Darugh Co. v. Gen.
Coal Co., 276 Fed. 502 (6th Cir. 1921) (Dicta).
8Kansas City Title & Trust Co. v. Fourth Nat1 Bank, 135 Kan. 414, 10 P.2d 896
(1932) (distinguishes between legal and conventional subrogation).
1167 F. Supp. at 452.
"See note 17 supra.
mIbid.
"135 Kan. 414, 10 P.2d 896 (1932).
CASE COMMENTS
money on forged endorsements by a real estate dealer, the court
reasoned that there was no duty owed by the surety to the third party
and that therefore there was no basis upon which to hold the third
party's equities superior.
In addition to the foregoing, there is one other factor which af-
fects the equities of the parties. Is the third party the one upon whom
the loss ultimately falls? Under well established law the bank which
is the recipient of payment upon a forged endorsement is liable for
the return of the payment.23 As stated by the Restatement of Restitu-
tion, "A person whose claim of title to a bill of exchange or promis-
sory note depends upon a forged or unauthorized indorsement and
who has received payment thereof from a person who was liable upon
the instrument as a party to it prior to such indorsement and who
pays without notice of the invalidity of the indorsement, is under
a duty to restore to the payor the amount received, unless he has
already satisfied the owner of the instrument."2 4 Thus the Bank of Fort
Mill was not ultimately liable, but the court considered its equities
as superior to those of the surety. This appears unjust in view of the
fact that the Bank of Fort Mill could recover its loss, if it were found
liable, in a subsequent suit against the First National Bank of South
Carolina.
If this factor is considered, the surety may be allowed to recover
from the third party drawee bank under a theory of subsuretyship.25
Subsuretyship is the relation between two sureties bound to answer
for the same duty of the principal debtor when one has the whole
duty in respect to the other.26 The surety would be liable to the credi-
tor initially, but it could recover from the third party ultimately. On
the other hand, if the third party is sued first, it cannot recover from
the surety. This result has not been considered by the courts.
"At common law the drawee could recover. La Fayette & Bro. v. Merchants'
Bank, 73 Ark. 561, 84 S.W. 700 (19o5); Canal Bank v. Bank of Albany, i Hill 287
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1841); Britton, Bills and Notes 641 (1943) (Through NIL § 196 common
law rules apply). Farmers Bank & Trust Co. v. Farmers State Bank, 148 Ark. 599, 231
S.W. 7 (19i2); Hartford-Conn. Trust Co. v. Riverside Trust Co., 123 Conn. 616, 197
Ad. 766 (1938); Merchants' Nat'l Bank v. Federal State Bank, 206 Mich. 8, 172 N.W.
390 (1919); United States Mortgage & Trust Co. v. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 112 Misc. 149,
184 N.Y. Supp. 52 (Sup. Ct. 192o ), aff'd 192 N.Y. Supp. 955 (App. Div. 1922); Penn-
sylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Real Estate-Land & Title & Trust Co., 116 Pa. Super.
81, 176 Atl. 747 (1935) (cases allowing recovery by drawee); see Beutel's Brannan
Negotiable Instruments Law 448 (7 th ed. 1948). This is a quasi-contractual action
for money had and received; it is not based on the NIL provision covering warranties
of endorsers. Britton, op. cit. supra at 643.
"Restatement, Restitution § 35 (1937)-
ZRestatement, Security § 145 (1941).
=Ibid.
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Any one of the previously enumerated factors has generally been
found sufficient to establish the surety's equities as being superior to
those of the third party.27 However, when none of the factors are
present or when the particular jurisdiction has not given weight to
the factors even though present, subrogation is usually denied.2 In
this situation, i.e., when the courts have found the equities of the
parties equal, rather than denying subrogation entirely the courts
should consider the recommendation of Professor Stephen I. Langmaid
for "contributive subrogation." 29
Under contributive subrogation the parties are considered co-
sureties. 30 Professor Langmaid advocated this doctrine to permit a
just solution when the equities of the parties are equal. Referring to
the fact that when the equities are equal the courts do not allow sub-
rogation between a true surety and a quasi-surety (one not liable under
a suretyship contract),31 he says, "If the equities of surety and quasi-
surety are in truth to be regarded as equal, the conception means
that the ultimate loss will lie where the creditor's choice has put it in
the first instance."3 2 Since each of the parties is liable for the loss,
is it not more reasonable to allow the one initially held liable to re-
cover contribution from the other? Professor Langmaid further says,
"That one should bear the whole burden while the other escapes
scot-free merely because the creditor chose the former is repugnant
to our theory of justice."33
Contribution 34 between sureties liable on the same debt in the
same manner has long been recognized by the courts; 35 contribution
"Stearns, Suretyship 448 (5th ed. 1951); see notes 12-18 supra.
2United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 172 F.2d 258, (5th Cir. 1949);
American Sur. Co. v. Bank of Calif., 133 F.2d i6o (9th Cir. 1943); Washington
Mechanics Say. Bank v. District Title Ins. Co., 65 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1933); Simpson,
Suretyship 220 (195o); cf. American Sur. Co. v. Lewis State Bank, 58 F.2d 559,
56o-61 (5th Cir. 1932), wherein it was said, "It [subrogation] is properly applied in
favor of a surety on a fidelity bond only against persons who have participated in
the wrong of its principal."
wLangmaid, Some Recent Subrogation Problems in the Law of Suretyship and
Insurance, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 976 (1934).
"'Where there are two co-sureties, each fully liable, and one is made to pay
more than his share, the doctrine of contriblution permits equalization of loss
between them .... It is this principle that lies at the foundation of the relations to




"For a general rule see Restatement, Security § 149 (1941).
"Peter v. Rich, i Chan. Rep. 34, 21 Eng. Rep. 499 (1629); Fleetwood v. Charnock,
Nelson io, 21 Eng. Rep. 776 (Ch. 1629). Originally the courts sought an implied
